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SUMMARY. Using a national dataset, this study demonstrates that religious 
traditionalism and political conservatism are positively related to family size and the 
interactions between these measures result in increased political participation. Combining 
the social capital of children and religiosity, these findings suggest that choosing to have 
more children may be based on beliefs about traditional gender roles and the importance 
of family in society, which in turn, results in political engagement around these issues. 
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Low voter turnout in the United States raises concerns about possible barriers to political 
participation and interest. These barriers become more problematic if they disproportionately 
affect one group of people, which seems to be the case with one of the most fundamental 
elements of the human condition – childbearing. Traditionally, the responsibility of rearing 
children has been viewed as a significant obstacle to participating in politics, especially for 
women, as they continue to contribute more hours to child care and associated household chores 
(Campbell et al. 1960; Nomaguchi and Milkie 2003; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The 
extent of these obstacles may be affected by whether a woman works outside of the home, the 
age of children and, especially, the number of children in need of care. This article is specifically 
concerned with the latter – how much does the addition of children affect one’s political 
participation? 
Some of the highest fertility rates in the United States occur in areas with higher 
concentrations of evangelical Christians1 or Mormons (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006), at the 
individual level, though individually evangelical Christians only have slightly more children than 
those of other faith traditions (Hout, Greeley and Wilde 2001; Lehrer 2004; Mosher, Williams, 
and Johnson 1992). Their families may not be larger than most, but the presence of children in 
the home may affect political engagement differently for evangelical mothers as compared to 
their peers. The involvement of women in forming the Christian Right (Critchlow 2005; Klatch 
1988) and the possibility of overcoming the political barrier of raising children with sufficient 
political interest (High-Pippert 1999) suggest that the same family values which lead to having 
more children may translate into a type of social capital that leads to political engagement (Lim 
and Putnam 2010; Offer and Schneider 2007; Smidt et al. 2003; Everitt 2006). Specifically, the 
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interaction between an individual’s religiosity and his or her number of children may influence 
political participation. 
GENDER AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 
 
Political engagement and participation require time, energy, interest, and resources – which 
lead scholars to refer to these factors as “costs” or “barriers.” Because the costs of participation 
are high, any number of obstacles may prevent individuals from engaging in politics – from 
taking time off of work and having adequate transportation for voting to being informed of 
political matters and developing civic skills (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Lewis-Beck et 
al. 2008; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). These costs disproportionately affect those of 
lower socioeconomic status, racial minorities, and women. Most of the literature on the political 
costs of childbearing argue that these barriers are tied to traditional gender roles and the historic 
lag of female participation or childcare challenges associated with low socioeconomic status 
(Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Campbell et al. 1960; Gidengil, O’Neill, and Young 2010; 
Sapiro 2006;Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Gender roles are not as clearly separated as 
they once were, though recent studies have reinforced that even with both parents working, 
women continue to take on more childcare and household duties (Nomaguchi and Milkie 2003). 
Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) provide a more nuanced perspective on the gender 
differential in political engagement by suggesting that the gap results from the confluence of 
available resources, recruitment, and political or psychological orientations. For the first two 
components, women continue to lag behind men in the major predictive categories of political 
participation: “education, income, and occupational status” (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001, 
359). Psychologically, women also tend to have less interest, knowledge and perceived efficacy 
than men. Once these items are accounted for, the presence of children, whether or not a woman 
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stays home with the children or possesses a full-time job did not significantly affect the gender 
gap in voting or other participatory acts (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). In further support 
of this hypothesis, High-Pippert (1999) found that traditional socio-economic status (SES) 
factors like income and education were more important predictors of voting than situational 
variables like the presence of children in the home. In addition, an individual’s political interest 
and efficacy were strong enough to offset the political costs of caring for children. 
Though the overall “gender gap” in political participation seems to have narrowed in recent 
years, there are still gender differences in the nature of political engagement and the effects of 
other factors. For example, low education more aversively affects voter turnout for women than 
men, but the voting gap disappears at high levels of education (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). When 
accounting for political knowledge, women with high levels of knowledge are more likely than 
men to vote, sport a political button, and work on a campaign and just as likely to influence a 
vote, go to a political meeting, or donate to a political cause (Ondercin and Jones-White 2011). 
Low levels of knowledge, however, adversely and disproportionately affect participation for 
women, as compared to men, in these areas. 
Similar to the entry of women into political office, “women hold themselves to a higher 
standard before engaging in political activities” (Ondercin and Jones-White 2011, 674). For the 
purposes of the current study, it is possible that women who bear more children because of a 
belief in traditional family structures feel knowledgeable on political issues and candidates that 
intersect with these beliefs. Indeed, women tend to be more knowledgeable and participate more 
in local school board elections (an area of politics that has been traditionally more open to 
women) than men (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001), so it stands to reason that women could 
3  
 
 
be mobilized more broadly around family issues in which they feel comfortable with their 
opinions. 
Some of the studies of traditional methods of participation may miss women’s political 
engagement in “loose, informal, more egalitarian, and local networks,” such as interactions with 
other parents, voluntary organizations, and religious affiliations (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 
2001; Stolle and Micheletti 2006, 46). It is in these localized networks where women have the 
opportunity to build social capital as well as engage in political discussions that enable them to 
“develop fundamental tools of political understanding” that solidify social identity locally within 
groups and possibly to a corresponding broader, larger social group (Cramer Walsh 2004, 2; 
Gidengil et al. 2006). Whether at church, with friends or in the home, religiously conservative 
women may be encountering consistent messages that promote traditional family structures and 
help them to identify with others who support their concerns, possibly in the political realm. The 
convergence of the social capital that is generated through children, family, and religion may 
then lead to increased political interest, knowledge, and participation. 
THE SOCIAL CAPITAL OF CHILDREN AND RELIGION 
 
The presence of children in the home does not have to serve as an obstacle to political 
engagement as they may provide avenues of social capital for their parents. Through school and 
extracurricular activities, children often involve their parents in social networks with other 
parents and the broader community (Offer and Schneider 2007; Sapiro 2006). In addition, 
involvement in religious communities, especially as it translates to building friendships in 
congregations, contributes to well being and the generation of social capital that can translate 
into civic engagement (Lim and Putnam 2010; Putnam 2000; Smidt et al. 2003; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wald, Kellstedt and Leege 1993) This involvement seems to be 
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especially effective for those with strong religious identities or those that report the importance 
of religion in their lives (Lim and Putnam 2010). The importance of religion measure also has 
been linked to increased intended and actual fertility in women (Hayford and Morgan 2008), 
indicating that women with strong religious identities purposefully tend to have more children 
than their peers and may also be reaping the benefits of congregational as well as child-induced 
social networking. Generation of this social capital would serve as a “bonding” rather than 
“bridging” capital, as it would focus on building a common identity of traditional gender roles 
and the importance of preserving family values and morality (Cramer Walsh 2004; Everitt 2006; 
Klatch 1988; Putnam 2000). 
If churches simultaneously promote childbearing and generate social networks, women in 
these networks may experience a “double effect” of social capital. In fact, religious institutions 
often use strategies to promote childbearing (Lehrer 2004; McQuillan 2004; Morgan 1996; 
Wilcox, Chaves, and Franz 2004), as some church leaders influence daily behavior of members 
through broadcasted norms and ensuing “sanctions ranging in format from guilt to damnation” 
(Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988, 13). Indeed, frequency of church attendance, regardless of 
denomination, is a strong predictor of an individual’s preference for families of three or more 
children (Hayford and Morgan 2008; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). 
Traditionally, most fertility studies involving religious influence have addressed the 
differences between Catholics and Protestants, as Catholics tended to have larger families; but 
currently, this gap is almost nonexistent due to later marriage by Catholics (resulting in fewer 
children) and larger families of Protestants who attend church frequently (Lehrer 2004; 
McQuillan 2004; Mosher, Williams and Johnson 1992). More recent studies focus on the fertility 
differentials between mainline and evangelical Protestants, mostly attributed to doctrinal 
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differences of evangelicals espousing stronger pronatalist views (be fruitful and multiply) and an 
aversion to contraceptives and abortion (playing God) (Marcum 1981; McQuillan 2004). Hout, 
Greeley, and Wilde (2001) found that 76% of conservative Protestant growth resulted from 
higher fertility and women beginning to bear children at younger ages, with women belonging to 
conservative denominations averaging close to one birth more than those associated with 
mainline Protestantism. The prevalence of conservative Protestant and Mormon churches also 
have been linked to local populations’ fertility patterns, with more conservative US counties 
reporting higher marital fertility and lower age of initial childbearing (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 
2006; Morrison 2009). These studies suggest that earlier age at first birth is the driving factor of 
higher overall fertility. 
Religious influence on fertility and political behavior also varies by race in the United 
States, but the current study will focus on non-black Americans, following the lead of recent 
religion and fertility literature. As Morrison (2009, 105) notes, “African Americans maintain a 
unique set of patterns: higher total fertility, earlier age of parenting, higher nonmarital fertility, 
and lower marital fertility” that also may interact with religious affiliation differently than non- 
blacks. Furthermore, the theoretical basis of the current study is the political mobilization of the 
religious right around Republican platforms of family values and moral decay, which mostly 
have been limited to non-black evangelicals (Layman 2001; Wuthnow 1988). 
RALLY ROUND THE FAMILY 
Denominational affiliation and personal religious beliefs are associated with childbearing 
trends, but there also may be overarching movements that are simultaneously encouraging 
traditional family structures and associated political participation. In the 1980s two conservative, 
Christian Right organizations, the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition, became socially 
6  
 
 
and politically influential in evangelical Protestant denominations (Brooks 2002; Layman 2001; 
Wilcox 1992; Wuthnow 1988). Several other organizations, like Concerned Women for America 
and Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum, were able to mobilize women because of the issue salience 
of matters relating to morality and family (Critchlow 2005; Klatch 1988). With the changing 
structure of the American family, including increases in divorce and single parenthood, 
conservative Protestants have reacted the “most forcefully and negatively” through promotions 
of pro-traditional-family literature and discourse (Brooks 2002; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006; 
Wilcox et al. 2004, 493). Many Christian Right organizations, like Focus on the Family, 
advocate heterosexual, married parent households, though they recently have shied away from 
explicitly teaching the necessity of stay-at-home mothers (Wilcox et al. 2004), or related issues 
of family size. 
In this way, fertility, or at least its motivation and initial onset, seems to be splitting along 
similar religious lines that divide partisan loyalties (Cahn and Carbone 2010; Layman 2001; 
Wuthnow 1988). Early studies examining the link between religion and politics established the 
tendency for non-Southern Protestants to identify with the Republican Party and Catholics and 
Jews with the Democrats (Layman 2001; Wuthnow 1988). Before the 1980s, “evangelical 
Christians were a large, unattached constituency” (Layman 2001, 45), divided between those 
more concerned with the kingdom of God than earthly politics, those in the South reconsidering 
their traditional home in the Democratic Party, and those in lower classes tied to New Deal 
Democrats (Fowler, Hertzke, and Olson 1999). When the GOP began to incorporate elements of 
cultural conservatism into their platforms, leaders like Phyllis Schlafly could “translate 
conservative ideas to grassroots activists and motivate them to achieve political goals,” thereby 
mobilizing evangelicals on issues of perceived moral decline (Critchlow 2005, 6; Fowler, 
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Hertzke, and Olson 1999; Layman 2001; Wilcox 1992; Klatch 1988). With the majority of 
evangelicals identifying with the Republican Party and supporting its candidates in the 1980s, 
1990s, and 2000s, they have become an important, consistent voting bloc for the GOP (Fowler et 
al. 1999; Layman 2001; Smidt et al. 2010; Wilcox 1992). 
What is it about these beliefs and practices that may simultaneously influence families 
and politics? Following the restructuring hypothesis (Wuthnow 1988), Layman (2001, 66) 
divides individuals into two categories -- “traditionalists,” which refers to individuals “with high 
levels of orthodoxy and commitment,” and their opposites, “modernists” -- as a means to 
examine the political differences among religious Americans. These terms take into account 
what Layman (2001) and others consider the three important factors in the relationship between 
politics and religion: believing (personal theology), belonging or affiliation, and behaving 
(religious involvement). If we think in terms of religious influence on fertility, believing would 
refer to one’s understanding of biblical instructions concerning childbearing. This could mean a 
complete adherence to something like the Quiverfull movement2 where one should not use birth 
control, family planning, or any other hindrance to reproduction or it could refer to one’s 
interpretation of a woman’s place in the home or society (Hagerty 2009; McQuillan 2004). 
Though the Quiverfull interpretation may seem extreme, beliefs of a woman’s primary role as 
wife and mother would be considered more orthodox or traditionalist. 
Behaving may be understood as either “ritual practice” or “private devotionalism” 
(Layman 2001, 57), and those with higher church participation tend to absorb more political 
guidance from others in their faith community (McQuillan 2004; Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 
1993). For example, if a pastor chooses to encourage the Bible’s message to “be fruitful and 
multiply” (Hagerty 2009), a church member who attends regularly may be more likely to adopt 
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this mindset. Furthermore, if fellow members are having larger families, regular attenders may 
be influenced by their peers (McQuillan 2004) as is the case for a Quiverfull family of 9 who 
attends an evangelical church where members average 8.5 children per household (Hagerty 
2009). 
The final factor of the religion-politics model encompasses the traditional understanding of 
religion’s role in public life – belonging or religious affiliation. Though the levels of believing 
and behaving mediate the effects of belonging, there are still strong relationships between 
religious affiliation and political ideology and behavior. The fertility literature has identified 
differences in childbearing across faith traditions, but the effects have been weak in some cases 
(Hout, Greeley, and Wilde 2001; Mosher, Williams, and Johnson 1992) or based on geographic 
concentrations of faith traditions where fertility differences may be more attributable to earlier 
ages of first birth (Cahn and Carbone 2010; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006; Morrison 2009). 
Because higher fertility is associated with a woman’s reported importance of religion in 
everyday life (Hayford and Morgan 2008), it may be more likely that individual believing and 
behaving could be more indicative of fertility choices over the singular measure of 
denominational affiliation. Higher levels of commitment and orthodoxy may lead to stronger 
gender role expectations that could be tied to both higher intended and actual fertility (Hayford 
and Morgan 2008) as well as political motivation on social issues tied to their religious beliefs 
(e.g. abortion, same-sex marriage). 
The combination of children and religious community involvement may lead to a greater 
store of “‘moral resources’ that lead to increased cooperation among individuals” (Smidt et al. 
2003, 153), which may translate into the generation of civic skills and eventual political 
involvement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Though the effects of church attendance or 
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involvement may not directly influence political engagement (Smidt et al. 2003), if church 
teachings, personal beliefs, and elite political messages intersect, translation of religious social 
capital to political mobilization may be more likely (Cahn and Carbone 2010; Layman 2001). As 
Wuthnow (1988, 202) suggests, the overlap of morality and politics led evangelicals to think of 
their involvement in the public sphere as less political and more “a public stand on matters they 
knew to be morally mandated as part of scripture.” This convergence of family values, political 
debate, and social capital may have led to the emergence of conservative female political activists 
and their ability to convince rank-and-file conservative women that “only women’s               
moral superiority could adequately confront the issues at hand” (Critchlow 2005; Klatch 1988; 
Rymph 2006, 5). That is, mothers who care about traditional family values because of their 
religious beliefs may possess the social capital and knowledge (Ondercin and Smith-Jones 2011), 
necessary to overcome the fact that childrearing may serve as a barrier to political engagement 
because it is for their children and their families that they choose to be politically involved. 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODS 
 
The hypotheses listed below were tested using the 2004 National Rolling Cross-Section of 
the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES)3, as it provided measures of the key variables 
(see Appendix A). Regarding an individual’s family size, the NAES asks for the number of 
children under the age of 18 living in the household. This could include grandchildren, foster 
children, adopted children, or any other children unrelated to the respondent, but it would not 
include deceased children or those over the age of 18 who have moved away. Because of this, 
many NAES respondents older than the age of 65 reported 0 children under 18 living in their 
households,4 with 0.69 children as the average number of children for all non-black respondents. 
The average age of this sample is 48 years-old, with a mean income falling between $35,000 and 
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$50,000, and mean educational attainment is some college or a two-year degree. Political 
ideology is included because the effects of children and religiosity on social capital are expected 
to be dependent on ideology, as more conservative women will experience this effect. Ideology 
was measured on a five-point scale, from very liberal (1) to very conservative (5), with a mean of 
3.2. As mentioned earlier, this study will focus on non-blacks, and the NAES race variable was 
recoded to a dichotomous variable of black and non-black, with the Black cases dropped from 
the analyses. 
For the religious traditionalist measurement, frequency of church attendance and having a 
born-again experience were combined into one variable. Individuals who were not born again 
were coded 0, and those that were born again received the score associated with frequency of 
attendance to account for their level of commitment – 1 through 5. Sixty percent of the non-black 
sample do not consider themselves born again, thereby scoring a 0 on this measure, and 24% are 
born again and attend church at least once a week, with a value of 4 or 5 on the measure. Though 
not perfectly correlated with denomination, these items reflect religious belief and behavior and 
are strong predictors of evangelical Protestant affiliation (Layman 2001; Smith 1990; Steensland 
et al. 2000). Unfortunately, the NAES affiliation measure only includes the categories Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, Orthodox, Muslim, Other, No denomination, and atheist or agnostic, 
so a comparison across traditionalist and modernist Protestant denominations would be 
impossible. There is a positive relationship between religious traditionalism and political 
ideology (r = 0.30, p < 0.001), and the relationship is similar for men and women. 
H1: Religious traditionalists are bearing more children than their peers. Previous research 
has focused on county-level data (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006; Morrison 2009) or strictly 
denominational affiliation (Hout, Greely, and Wilde 2001; Mosher et al. 1992) when exploring 
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fertility differences among American Christians. To test the hypothesis that the beliefs and 
messages that may mobilize conservative women politically are encouraging higher fertility 
rates, it is important to determine whether religious traditionalists are having more children than 
their peers, which is a slightly different measure than previously used in the literature. 
There are positive but weak, relationships between an individual’s number of children in the 
home and religious traditionalism (r = 0.03, p < 0.001) and ideology (r = 0.06, p < 0.001). To 
account for demographic variables that directly influence family size, total children was 
regressed on traditionalism, ideology, age, marital status, education, and income. As displayed in 
Table 1, tobit analysis was used as the dependent variable “has a number of its values clustered  
at a limiting value” (McDonald and Moffitt 1980, 318), with 65% of the non-black sample 
reporting 0 children. Tobit left-censors the dependent variable, with an assumption that not 
everyone in the “zero” category can be treated the same. In addition, the coefficients generated 
through the tobit method provide more a intuitive understanding than other count variable 
methods. When compared to an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model with the same 
parameters, the coefficients increase for age and marriage and change directions on income. For 
example, when accounting for those whose children have left home and are not measured 
(censored in the 0 category), age becomes a stronger predictor of family size as growing older 
gives individuals more time to have more children. Importantly, the key predictors were 
significant and in the hypothesized direction in the OLS and tobit models. 
With each one-point increase on the traditionalism score (essentially being born again and 
increased church attendance), an individual’s number of children in the home increases by 0.03 
(p < 0.001), holding all other variables constant. A similar relationship emerges for political 
ideology, as a one-point increase in conservatism results in an 0.11-increase in the number of 
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children, accounting for all the other variables. These relationships are consistent for men and 
women and support the first hypothesis. 
<Insert Table 1 About Here> 
 
Political Participation 
 
H2: Each additional child will more negatively affect the political behavior of women over 
men. 
H3: The negative relationship between childbearing and political behavior is moderated by 
religious traditionalism and political ideology. 
If individuals who frequently attend church and are born again tend to bear more children, 
the next step is to test whether children combined with religiosity translates into social capital 
that helps these individuals overcome barriers to political participation. Since socioeconomic 
status and individual interest in politics are consistent and strong predictors of voting behavior 
(Berinsky 2005; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), we would not expect one’s number of 
children or its interaction with traditionalism or ideology to have much effect on voting as a 
dependent variable. Because the NAES was administered at different intervals throughout the 
2004 presidential campaign and election, the most consistent and largest sample size question 
referred to the respondent’s voting behavior in the 2000 presidential election. See Appendix A 
for wording on the question and coding specifics. 
The bivariate relationship between voting and total number of children in the home is 
negative for women (r = -0.14, p < 0.001) and men (r = -0.05, p < 0.001). A logistic regression 
was performed on the dichotomous dependent variable of voting for the full population and then 
split by gender, with number of children, traditionalism, ideology and the interaction terms as 
key variables. Results are displayed in Table 2. Because of the difficulty in interpreting logged 
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odds, the logit coefficients were transformed into odds ratios. By subtracting one from the odds 
ratio, we can determine the odds a person will vote when the independent variable is increased by 
one unit and all others are held constant. Contrary to the second hypothesis, the odds of       
voting decrease for each additional child in the home for women and men, though the 
relationship only reaches traditional levels of statistical significance in the model with both 
genders. Increased traditionalism and conservative ideology are associated with increased odds of 
voting, with a 1-point increase in religious traditionalism resulting in a 6% increase in the      odds 
of voting for women and a 9% increase for men, holding all other variables constant. There is a 
stronger relationship between ideology and voting for men over women, as a 1-point increase in 
conservatism results in a 21%-increase (p < 0.001) in odds a man will vote, compared to a 5%- 
increase (p < 0.05) for women. 
There is no relationship between the interaction of children and traditionalism and the odds 
of voting. At the very least, we can conclude that if one increases traditionalism with each 
additional child, the odds are no more or less likely that the individual will vote more than his or 
her peers. In essence, the interaction neutralizes the negative relationship between number of 
children and voting. Interestingly, the interaction between number of children and political 
ideology achieves statistical significance, as increases in conservatism among those with the 
same number of children results in a 3% increase in the odds that individual voted in the 2000 
election, holding all other variables constant. These findings partially support the third 
hypothesis that political ideology moderates the negative effects of children on political 
behavior. 
<Insert Table 2 About Here> 
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Voting is just one form of political engagement and may be the bluntest measure as the 
choice of political candidates may not translate directly to the intersection of children, religion, 
social capital, and political issues related to family. Political discussions with friends and family 
may be more applicable to conservative Christians who are issue-driven with policies that tend to 
coincide with religious beliefs and be spoken about in their social networks. Specifically, 
preferences of traditional gender roles and the importance of family may be discussed in both 
religious and political terms, joining the social capital forces of children and religiosity to 
generate political interest, discussion, and increased knowledge that all can lead to feeling more 
prepared to participate (Gidengil et al. 2006; Ondercin and Smith-Jones 2011). The NAES asks 
respondents how many days in the last week they discussed politics with friends or family, with 
scores ranging from zero to seven. The overall mean for non-blacks is 2.98 days a week, with a 
significant mean difference between women (2.92) and men (3.06). The number of children in 
the home and the frequency of political discussion are negatively correlated, though weakly, for 
women (r = -0.07, p < 0.001) and men (r = -0.03, p < 0.001). 
Number of days of political discussion was regressed on total children, traditionalism, 
ideology, and the interaction terms, along with age, marital status, education, and income, with 
the results shown in Table 3. The negative relationship between frequency of political discussion 
and number of children in the home remains statistically significant, holding all other variables 
constant, for women (β = -0.12, p < 0.001) and men (β = -0.10, p < 0.001), supporting the 
hypothesis that women are more affected than men by the presence of children in the home. 
There is a weak but positive relationship between traditionalism and political discussion for men 
(β = 0.01, p < 0.10) and no relationship for women, and ideology is negatively related to 
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discussion for women (β = -0.04, p < 0.001). As women decrease ideological conservatism, their 
discussion increases – which is the opposite effect from voting. When combined into interaction 
terms, significant relationships emerge in the hypothesized direction. For individuals with the 
same number of children, a 1-point increase in traditionalism results in a 0.02-day increase (p < 
0.001) in frequency of political discussion, holding all other variables constant. This relationship 
holds for men (B = 0.03, p < 0.01) but drops in significance for women (B = 0.01, p < 0.10). The 
interaction between ideology and number of children is significant for all models, regardless of 
gender. Holding all other variables constant, a 1-point increase in ideology, among those with the 
same number of children, is associated with a 0.04-day increase (p < 0.001) in frequency of 
political discussion. Though the number of children in the home decreases political discussion, 
this effect is reversed when accounting for ideology and religiosity, with more conservative and 
more traditionalist individuals discussing politics more than their peers with the same number of 
children. 
<Insert Table 3 About Here> 
 
A third test of the hypothesis was performed with an OLS regression on the extent to which 
an individual follows politics – most times (4), sometimes (3), now and then (2), or hardly at all, 
with an overall mean of 3.11 (1). There is a weak, bivariate relationship between following 
politics and number of children in the home (r = -0.09, p < 0.001), with a stronger relationship 
for women (r = -0.15, p < 0.001) than men (r = -0.07, p < 0.001). Table 3 displays the results of 
following politics regressed on total children, traditionalism, ideology, the interaction terms, and 
demographic variables. Consistent with the previous tests of political engagement, number of 
children is negatively related to an individual’s tendency to follow politics, with women (β = - 
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0.10, p < 0.001) slightly more affected than men (β = -0.07, p < 0.01). Religiosity is significantly 
related to following politics for women, as a 1-point increase in traditionalism results in a 0.02- 
point increase in political interest (p < 0.001), holding all other variable constant. Religiosity is 
not significant for men, but ideology is related to following politics, as a 1-point increase in 
conservatism results in a 0.05-increase in interest (p < 0.001). Ideology was not significant for 
women, but its interaction with number of children results in a positive relationship with the 
dependent variable. Among women with the same number of children, a 1-point increase in 
conservatism results in a 0.02-increase in following politics (p < 0.001), holding all other 
variables constant. This interaction was not significant for men, and the interaction between 
traditionalism and number of children was only weakly related to following politics for men (p < 
0.10, and not at all related for women.) 
<Insert Table 4 About Here> 
 
In sum, even when accounting for the powerful relationships between forms of political 
participation and age, income, education, and marital status, the key variables in this study 
significantly contributed to these models. The number of children in the home had consistent, 
negative effects on individuals’ political engagement, and though this relationship held for men 
and women, women were slightly more affected. The interactions between number of children 
and traditionalism either neutralized the negative effects of children (following politics and 
voting for men and women and political discussion for women) or reversed the relationship 
(discussing politics for men). Interestingly, the interaction effects were stronger for ideology and 
number of children as it resulted in an increase in voting, discussing politics with friends and 
family, and following politics for women and voting and discussing politics for men. This 
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generates questions of causality concerning whether religiosity, as it is measured here, is driving 
political and fertility behavior or if political ideology is the influential force. 
To test a possible three-way interaction between ideology, religiosity, and children, the 
sample was split by ideology – conservatives, moderates, and liberals – and the participation 
models performed again.5 Regarding political discussion for men (results not shown), there is a 
negative relationship with number of children, but this is reversed for the interaction between 
religiosity and children such that an increase in traditionalism results in more political discussion 
among those with the same number of children, holding all other variables constant. This 
relationship between the interaction term and discussion holds weakly for liberals (β = 0.03, p < 
0.10) and significantly for moderates (β = 0.04, p < 0.01) and conservatives (β = 0.03, p < 0.05). 
Among men with similar political ideology, increased traditionalism is associated with increased 
political discussion, with the same number of children present in the home. The results shift for 
women, as displayed in Table 5. 
<Insert Table 5 about Here> 
 
For liberal and moderate women, the number of children in the home and traditionalism are 
negatively associated with political discussion. As one’s number of children increases, these 
women are less likely to discuss politics with friends and family than their ideological peers, 
holding all other variables constant. Increases in religious traditionalism among liberals and 
moderates also are less likely to discuss politics, but when combined with children in an 
interaction term, this affect reverses or at least neutralizes the negative effects (liberals: β = 0.03, 
p < 0.10; moderates: β = 0.02, p < 0.10). Among their ideological peers with the same number of 
children, increases in religious traditionalism results in more political discussion for liberals and 
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moderates. For ideological conservatives, children still negatively affect discussion (β = -0.05, p 
 
< 0.01), traditionalism increases discussion (β = 0.04, p < 0.01), but the interaction between 
children and traditionalism is not significant (β = 0.00, p = 0.789). 
Because ideology and its interaction with number of children were stronger predictors than 
religiosity of women’s political engagement, the latter results indicate a point of marginal returns 
– that is, when a woman is already ideologically conservative, increases in church 
attendance/being born again (traditionalism) and number of children do not form additional  
social capital. As was demonstrated in the original discussion model in Table 3, increases in 
ideology make the difference for those with the same number of children, with traditionalism and 
the other variables held constant. 
To examine this relationship from another angle, women in the sample were grouped by 
level of religious traditionalism where low = those who are not born again; medium=born again 
and attend church between never and a few times a month; and high = born again and attend 
weekly or more. Similar effects emerge as the interaction between children and ideology is 
significant only among women low in traditionalism. That is, though children and ideological 
conservatism have negative effects on political discussion, the interaction indicates that among 
non-born again women with the same number of children, increases in political conservatism 
result in discussing politics more days of the week (β = 0.11, p < 0.001). The traditionalist 
measure is somewhat blunt because it treats all non-born again women the same, regardless of 
frequency of church attendance. Among women who are not born again, there is a positive, 
bivariate relationship between ideology and church attendance (r = 0.18, p < 0.001) so increases 
in conservatism interacting with number of children on discussion may be representing social 
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capital built through church attendance. The bottom line is that it appears conservatism, whether 
ideological or religious, may represent an underlying motivation for women – and men -- to 
choose larger family sizes and remain politically active, as compared to their peers with the same 
number of children. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this sample, political conservatism and religious traditionalism are positively associated 
with increases in the number of children in the home. The number of children present in the home 
also is negatively associated with political participation, but these effects are neutralized or    
even reversed when accounting for religiosity and ideology. Children alone are not serving as 
political capital, as increasing numbers result in decreased political behavior. Traditionalism, 
measured by religious belief and church attendance, appears to confirm earlier studies of the 
influence of religious identity and involvement in building social capital for voting and following 
politics (Lim and Putnam 2010; Smidt et al. 2003). Children only emerge as a form of social 
capital when combined with religious traditionalism or political conservatism, and though the 
effect is not universal across the dependent variables in this study, this pattern emerges for both 
men and women. Former studies have suggested that marriage and children have better served 
men over women in regards to political engagement (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Sapiro 
2006), but in the case of religious and/or political conservatives, women also may be converting 
their families and accompanying social identities into social capital. Burns, Schlozman, and 
Verba (2001, 321) suggest that though their data do not demonstrate adverse, independent effects 
for marriage and children on participation, these family structures seem to be “channeling 
individuals into secondary institutions,” such as religion and the workforce for men, that do 
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influence political behavior. The current study suggests religion, children, and the accompanying 
social identity when the two converge could be “channeling” women in the same way. 
These findings reaffirm the success of grassroots conservative movements in mobilizing two 
formerly low-participating groups – evangelicals and women – around a set of values central to 
their worldview. In 2004 NAES, both men and women reported participating less with each 
additional child, but the presence of children and conservative preferences generated more 
engagement than their peers, indicating another form of social capital may influence 
participation: when personal identity coincides with political issue salience. Scholars have long 
recognized that the religious right were mobilized on family-related policy (Layman 2001; 
Wuthnow 1988), but the current study provides additional understanding of why this 
mobilization may have occurred and continues to be the case. Taking a “moral stand” (Wuthnow 
1988, 202) through political engagement around these issues could be a result of social identities 
formed through informal conversations encountered by frequent church attendance or association 
with other like-minded individuals. These discussions, perhaps about abortion or gay marriage, 
may increase individuals’ knowledge about issues and possible candidates as well as solidifying 
social identities that fit into a broader group (Cramer Walsh 2004). If women who would 
typically exhibit less political interest and participation are able to increase their knowledge and 
sense of efficacy (Ondercin and Smith-Jones 2011; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001) in 
knowing they belong to a broader movement (e.g. affiliation with the Moral Majority), the 
participation disparity disappears, as compared to men and women with fewer or no children. In 
this way, children and political and religious conservatism build social capital that may generate 
the knowledge and efficacy needed for women to feel adequately prepared for the political realm 
(Ondercin and Smith-Jones 2011; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). As Everitt (2006, 274) 
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suggests, “social capital is more important to the political orientations of women who see their 
lives based in the private sphere of home and the family than it is to those women with more 
egalitarian gender-role beliefs who are already actively involved in the labor force.” The latter 
women may be acquiring the resources, recruitment, and psychological orientations necessary 
for political involvement more similarly to men (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001), but the 
former may rely more upon the informal conversations and lifestyle or religious networks to 
provide them with the tools necessary for political involvement. 
The relationships between religiosity, children, and political engagement are less clear for 
liberal women. When there appears to be a cross-pressure to what might be considered a typical 
liberal identity, such as increased religious traditionalism or an increase in the number of 
children, political discussion decreases. It is possible that a political liberal who is born again and 
frequently attends church and/or has a large family may not discuss politics with those around 
them because they may be in social networks of conservatives (who agree with them religiously 
or share the commonality of children but politically disagree) or other liberals (who agree 
politically but disagree religiously and may not be supportive of large families). But the 
interaction between religious traditionalism and number of children has a small positive effect on 
discussion for liberals, suggesting that the shared identity of conservative religiosity and 
increases in family size may provide more avenues for liberals to engage in political discussion. 
There are other possible explanations, but further research could uncover how the convergence  
of gender, family life, religion, and ideology influences social networks to either promote or 
discourage political discussion and engagement (Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague 2004; Mutz 
2006). Women, mothers, religious individuals, and ideologues cannot be treated as monolithic 
groups in their approach to politics. Understanding how various social identities--gender, race, 
22  
 
 
religion, social class—and their interactions within individuals and groups impact political 
engagement may continue to illuminate existing disparities and possible barriers to democratic 
participation and a better represented citizenry. 
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APPENDIX A: NATIONAL ANNENBERG ELECTION STUDY VARIABLES 
 
Children: How many children under age 18 now live in your house or apartment? Measure: 0 
through 8; 9 or more. 
 
Ideology: Generally speaking, would you describe your political views as very conservative (5), 
conservative (4), moderate (3), liberal (2), or very liberal (1)? 
 
Vote: Did you vote in the 2000 presidential election when George W. Bush ran against Al Gore? 
If yes: did you vote for George W. Bush, the Republican; Al Gore, the Democrat; Pat Buchanan 
of the Reform Party; Ralph Nader of the Green Party; or someone else? Measure: 1=Yes, voted 
for Bush, Gore, Buchanan, Nader or someone else; 0=Did not vote. 
 
Political Discussion: How many days in the past week did you discuss politics with your family 
or friends? Measure: 0-7 
 
Follow Politics: Some people seem to follow what is going on in government and public affairs 
most of the time, whether there is an election or not. Others are not that interested, or are 
interested in other things. Would you say you follow what is going on in government and public 
affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all? 
 
Church Attendance: How often do you attend religious services, apart from special events like 
weddings or funerals – more than once a week, once a week, once or twice a month, a few times 
a year, or never? 1=Never; 2=A few times a year; 3=Once or twice a month; 4=Once a week; 
5=More than once a week. 
 
Born Again: Do you consider yourself an evangelical or born-again Christian? Measure: 1=Yes; 
0=No. 
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Table 1: Tobit Results of Total Number of Children on Religious Traditionalism and 
Ideology 
 
 
National Annenberg Election Survey 
 
Women and Men 
Coef. 
Women 
Coef. 
Men 
Coef. 
Traditionalism 0.03*** (0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Ideology 0.11*** (0.01) 
0.13*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
Age -0.09*** (0.00) 
-0.10*** 
(0.00) 
-0.09*** 
(0.00) 
Married 1.58*** (0.03) 
1.09*** 
(0.03) 
2.22*** 
(0.04) 
Education -0.04*** (0.00) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Income 0.05*** (0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.01) 
Constant 2.19*** (0.06) 
2.93*** 
(0.08) 
1.22*** 
(0.09) 
N 55,534 30,691 24,843 
Chi-square 18,623*** 11,443.04*** 8,003.44*** 
Log-likelihood -59,281.38 -32,361.90 -26,506.32 
Left-censored 
   
observations at 34,712 19,090 15,622 
children ≤ 0  
 
Notes: *p< 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; †<0.10 (two-tailed tests); standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Table 2: Logistic Regression Results of Voting on Number of Children, Religious 
Traditionalism and Ideology 
 
 
 
 
National Annenberg Election Survey 
 
Women and Men 
 
Coef. Odds 
Women 
 
Coef. Odds 
Men 
 
Coef. Odds 
Children -0.09* (0.04) -8% 
-0.09† 
(0.05) -8% 
-0.10† 
(0.06) -10% 
Traditionalism 0.07*** (0.01) 13% 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 6% 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 9% 
Ideology 0.11*** (0.02) 12% 
0.05* 
(0.02) 5% 
0.19*** 
(0.02) 21% 
Tradition x Child -0.001 0% 0.00 0% -0.01 1%  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Ideology x Child 0.03** 3% 0.03* 3% 0.04* 4%  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Age 0.06*** (0.00) 6% 
0.07*** 
(0.00) 7% 
0.06*** 
(0.00) 6% 
Married 0.26*** (0.03) 30% 
0.27*** 
(0.04) 31% 
0.26*** 
(0.04) 32% 
Education 0.30*** (0.01) 35% 
0.32*** 
(0.01) 38% 
0.28*** 
(0.01) 30% 
Income 0.20*** (0.01) 22% 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 24% 
0.19*** 
(0.01) 32% 
Constant -4.36*** (0.08) 
 -4.46*** 
(0.11) 
 -4.30*** 
(0.12) 
Pseudo R2 0.22  0.23  0.21 
N 54,395  29,997  24,398 
Notes: *p< 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; †<0.10 (two-tailed tests); standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3: Results from OLS Regression of Discussing Politics with Friends or Family on 
Number of Children, Religious Traditionalism, and Political Ideology 
 
 
 
NAES 
 
 
 
 
 
Children 
Traditionalism 
Ideology 
Tradition x Child 
Ideology x Child 
Age 
Married 
Education 
Income 
Constant 
R-square 
N 
Men and Women Women  Men 
B SE β B SE β B SE β 
- 
0.26*** 0.03 -0.12 -0.27*** 0.04 -0.12 -0.23*** 0.05 -0.10 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02† 0.01 0.01 
- 
0.07*** 0.01 -0.03 -0.11*** 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 
0.02*** 0.01 0.02 0.01† 0.01 0.02 0.03** 0.01 0.03 
0.04*** 0.01 0.07 0.05*** 0.01 0.07 0.03* 0.02 0.05 
0.01*** 0.00 0.08 0.02*** 0.00 0.11 0.01*** 0.00 0.06 
0.48*** 0.02 0.09 0.55*** 0.03 0.11 0.41*** 0.04 0.08 
0.17*** 0.01 0.15 0.17*** 0.01 0.15 0.18*** 0.01 0.17 
0.14*** 0.01 0.11 0.14*** 0.01 0.11 0.13*** 0.01 0.11 
0.71*** 0.06  0.65*** 0.09  0.72*** 0.09  
 0.08   0.08   0.07  
 55, 302   30,575   24,727  
 
Notes: *p< 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; †<0.10 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 4: Results from OLS Regression of Following Politics on Number of Children, 
Religious Traditionalism, and Political Ideology 
 
 
 
NAES 
 
 
 
 
Children 
Traditionalism 
Ideology 
Tradition x 
Child 
Ideology x 
Child 
Age 
Married 
Education 
Income 
Constant 
R-square 
N 
Men and Women Women Men 
B SE β B SE β B SE β 
-0.08*** 0.01 -0.10 -0.09*** 0.02 -0.10 -0.05** 0.02 -0.07 
0.01* 0.00 0.01 0.02*** 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.03*** 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05*** 0.01 0.05 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01† 0.00 0.02 
0.02*** 0.00 0.07 0.02*** 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.04 
0.01*** 0.00 0.25 0.02*** 0.00 0.29 0.01*** 0.00 0.21 
0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.02 
0.08*** 0.00 0.20 0.08*** 0.00 0.19 0.08*** 0.00 0.22 
0.06*** 0.00 0.13 0.05*** 0.00 0.11 0.05*** 0.00 0.12 
1.67*** 0.02  1.60*** 0.04  1.81*** 0.03  
0.14  0.14   0.14  
42,683  23,532   19,151  
 
 
Notes: *p< 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; †<0.10 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 5: Results from OLS Regression of Women Discussing Politics with Friends or 
Family on Number of Children, Religious Traditionalism, and Political Ideology 
 
 
 
NAES 
 
 
 
 
 
Children 
 
Traditionalism 
Tradition x 
Child 
Age 
Married 
Education 
Income 
Constant 
R-square 
N 
Liberals  Moderates  Conservatives 
B SE β B SE β B SE β 
-0.17*** 0.03 -0.07 -0.12*** 0.03 -0.05 -0.09** 0.03 -0.05 
-0.08** 0.03 -0.05 -0.04** 0.01 -0.03 0.04** 0.01 0.04 
0.03† 0.02 0.03 0.02† 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 
0.02*** 0.00 0.11 0.02*** 0.00 0.12 0.01** * 0.00 0.09 
0.41*** 0.07 0.08 0.53*** 0.05 0.11 0.65** * 0.05 0.12 
0.23*** 0.02 0.21 0.15*** 0.01 0.14 0.13** * 0.01 0.11 
0.11*** 0.02 0.08 0.13*** 0.01 0.11 0.16** * 0.01 0.13 
0.51*** 0.15  0.12 0.11  0.34** 0.12  
 0.10  0.08   0.07  
 6,750  12,086   11,739  
 
Notes: *p< 0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; †<0.10 (two-tailed tests) 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
 
1Evangelical Christians, conservative Protestants, and religious traditionalists (Layman 2001) 
will be used interchangeably in this author’s work, using the preferred label when citing a 
respective author. Evangelical or conservative Protestants and religious traditionalists tend to 
report having a born-again experience, believe in a literal translation of the Bible, and ascribe to 
orthodox beliefs, while mainline Protestants or religious modernists, usually belonging to 
Methodist, Episcopalian, or Presbyterian churches, usually do not view the Bible as the literal 
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word of God and focus more on social justice issues on earth rather than an emphasis on personal 
salvation and the afterlife (Layman 2001; Smith 1990). 
2 The term “Quiverfull” is based upon Psalm 127, which indicates parents should want as many 
 
sons as a warrior desires arrows in his quiver (Hagerty 2009). 
 
3 Annenberg Public Policy Center. 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey. University of 
Pennsylvania. 
4 The models performed similarly when NAES respondents over the age of 65 were dropped 
from the analysis, with the magnitude of some of the co-efficients changing slightly due to 
difference in mean number of children. 
5 Removing ideology from the voting model and setting it as a grouping variable resulted in 
number of children completely dropping from significance, and since it was the variable of 
interest, this model will not be examined here. Because the interaction between traditionalism 
and number of children was not significant in the original following politics model, it is not 
surprising that it also was not significant when the sample was then split by ideology. 
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